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Air pollution is increasingly becoming an important problem for the
United States. It is estimated that air pollution contributes to the
premature deaths of more than 50,000 people a year and costs the nation $10
billion to $20 billion annually in health bills. ' Motor vehicles currently
contribute an estimated 40% to the ozone problem in urban areas and account
for all carbon monoxide emissions.
The combustion of gasoline generates large amounts of N02 , CO and
evaporative hydrocarbons. N02 reacts in the atmosphere to form acid rain and
ozone, CO interferes with oxygen absorption, and evaporative hydrocarbons
react with sunlight to form photochemical smog and ozone. Alternative fuels
are being considered to reduce ozone causing emissions.
In 1988 a law was passed to promote the development of vehicles using
alternative fuels such as ethanol, methanol, hydrogen and compressed natural
gas. Recently, a new Clean Air Bill was signed in to law by president Bush.
This law mandates that all gasoline sold in the nine smoggiest cities in the
nation must cut emissions of hydrocarbons and toxic pollutants by 15 percent,
beginning in 1995, and by 20 percent, beginning in 2000. By 1998, all car
fleets in the nations's dirtiest two dozen cities must run 80 percent cleaner
than today's autos. Moreover, auto makers must begin producing at least
150,000 super clean cars by 1996, under California's pilot program to launch
'See the Wall Street Journal, October 29, 1990.
2vehicles that can run on non-gasoline fuels such as natural gas or methanol.
Although the new law does not mandate the use of methanol as an alternative
fuel as strongly as past proposals, it is evident that an alternative fuel
such as methanol will be a strong possibility in the near future.
Aside from pollution issues, alternative fuels are also being
considered from a national security point of view. As Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait has shown, the Middle East is not such a stable source of supply for
oil. Such instability can cause a disruption in oil supplies, thus causing
great volatility in oil prices. The use of methanol could lessen the risks of
an oil supply disruption and the consequent price shock.
If policies are implemented to promote methanol use, they could have
immediate and long term implications on the international oil market and could
change the economics of gasoline relative to methanol. To capture these
changes we simulate such policies using a dynamic optimal control model of the
world oil market. We compute price and output paths for OPEC and the U.S.,
assuming OPEC is a profit maximizing dominant firm and U.S. producers are
competitive price takers. We then trace the effects of the switch to methanol
on world oil prices, domestic fuel prices, domestic producers of oil, domestic
consumers of fuel and the nations's oil import share and oil import bill.
2. Model
We utilize a partial equilibrium model of the international oil market to
examine the effects of alternative fuels on the oil market. Given the
concentration of reserves in OPEC countries l and in the interest of keeping
the model reproducible and relatively transparent, we focus our analysis on
OPEC and U.S. producers. In the model OPEC is a dominant firm facing U.S.total demand for oil minus U.S. domestic production and non-OPEC U.S. imports.
Domestic producers are taken to be profit maximizing price takers on the U.S.
crude oil market. Both the U.S. and OPEC own oil reserves and maximize their
profits over a given time horizon T. We simulate the problem for a base case
with the demand for oil normalized around 1987 product demand, where gasoline
is based 100 percent on oil. We then simulate with the demand for oil based
on two different mixtures of gasoline and methanol most often discussed: a 85
percent methanol and 15 percent gasoline mixture (M8S) , and 100 percent
methanol (MIOO). M8S and MIOO are phased-in slowly over the average life of a
vehicle. It is assumed that the use of methanol will be mandated by the
government and hence all vehicles will be dedicated vehicles and will be using
methanol by the end of the phasing-in period.
The general maximization problem for the U.S. is to choose the production
path Qu that maximizes:
of' [P - Cu(Ru)JQu e-rtdt




while OPEC chooses the production path Qo that maximizes
of [f(Qu,Qo) - Co(Ro)JQo e-rtdt (2a)
subject to
Ro - -Qo. (2b)
In the above expressions, P is the price of oil, f is the inverted demand
function for domestic and OPEC oil by U.S. consumers, Qo is OPEC oil
production going to U.S. markets, Qu is U.S. domestic oil production, Ru and
Ro are reserve levels, and r is the real interest rate. Gu and Co are average
costs of production, the functional forms of which are developed in the next
4section.
The Hamiltonian for the U.S. is
H ~ [P - Cu]Qu e-r t + Pu(-Qu)
The first order conditions are
HQ u - [P - Cu]e-
r t
- Pu - 0
M u = ~HRu == CURuQU e-rt
Similarly, for OPEC we have
H ~ [f(Qu,Qo) - Co]Qo e-r t + Po(-Qo)
HQ o ~ [(fQoQo + f) _Co]e-r t Po - 0







The solution to the above maximization problem will need to satisfy the
constraints (lb),(2b) and the optimality conditions (4), (5), (7) and (8).
Since an analytical solution is not possible, this differential system is
solved numerically using Miele's (1970, 1974) highly efficient Modified
Quasilinearization Algorithm. We construct performance indices which measure
the residuals in the constraints and the optimality conditions and seek an
iterative solution which will make these indices smaller than a preselected
convergence criterion, chosen to be 10-6 for our problem.
3. Model Inputs
To develop U.S. demand for domestic and OPEC oil we start with total U.S.
demand for oil products:
Qt ~ Qu + Qo + Qn + Qp
where Qt ~ the total U.S. demand for oil products. Qu, Qo, Qn, and Qp are the
demand for products satisfied by domestic oil, OPEC oil, non-OPEC oil, and net
product imports respectively. Qt is a constant elasticity function of demand
5price Pd and income Y or:'
To simplify the analysis and focus on the U.S. and OPEC, non-OPEC imports
to the U.S. are initially taken as constant at their 1987 level (841.325
million barrels per year) over the simulation period. 3
Qu + Qo + 841.325 + Qp - aPdPy~
Since consumer welfare depends on the demand for oil products, we must first
relate this demand to the derived demand for domestic and OPEC oil which is an
input into our simulation model. Product imports are assumed to be the same
percent, ¢, of U.S. total demand as in 1987 and product demand price Pd is
assumed to be the same percent, 0, of product supply price, P. Under these
assumptions, U.S. demand for crude oil as a function of supply price of oil
(P) is:
Qu + Qo + 841.325- (l-¢) a(OP)P~
and price as a function of U.S. and OPEC production is:
P - (l/¢) [l/«l-¢)a)(Qu + Qo+ 84l.325)]'/P y-~/P
There are a number of estimates of price and income elasticity for crude
oil and an even larger number of estimates of elasticities for various
petroleum products. From these, we choose a base case income elasticity of
0.8. The price elasticity of oil is a weighted average of the product
elasticities. We normalize around 1987 variable values giving an inverted
, We chose the constant elasticity functional form because it is by far
the most popular for econometric estimates of oil product demand. Good in
sample fits have been obtained even over rather long estimation periods.
3 Oil export forecasts from the International Energy Workshop poll of 64
organizations (See Manne and Schrattenholzer (1989», suggest that holding
non-OPEC imports into the U.S. constant is a reasonable upper bound.
6demand function of:4
P - 136.83 (Qu + Qo + 841.325)-l.ly,a9
When methanol is blended with gasoline, a portion of gasoline is replaced
by methanol, shifting the gasoline demand curve inward. To obtain the
quantity of gasoline demanded a new gasoline price and a new product weighted
average elasticity of oil is calculated. The demand for oil with M85 is:
P - 70.79155 (Qu + Qo + 841. 325)-l.OSSS2y.844
and the demand for oil with MlOO is:
P - 62.79154 (Qu +Qo +841. 325)-l.042y.B88
Moving on to the supply side of the market, estimated proven reserves for
the U.S. are taken as 100.6 million barrels. This U.S. number, which includes
an allowance for future oil to be found, is derived from U.S. Bureau of the
Mines estimates. The reserves for OPEC are taken to be 769.2 million
barrels.S
The average cost functions for OPEC and the U.S. are from Dahl(1989).
They are a function of reserves and have a time trend built in.
Cu 33.13 - 0.0002832Ru + 0.21t
Co 23.232 - 0.000026Ro +0.016t
4 For surveys of these elasticities see Bohi (1981), Bohi and
Zimmerman (1984), and Dahl (1986). Many of the derived estimates for product
price elasticity are between -.3 and -1.6, while many of those for income
elasticity are between .6 and 1.4. We have experimented with price
elasticities ranging from -.7 to -1.1. The 1987 values are normalized around
1987 product demand minus net product imports of 5.624 billion barrels, GDP of
$4.461 trillion, and an oil supply price of $16.35.
5See International Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Activities
(1990) .
7After the simulations are completed and price and output paths for oil
obtained, we calculate the price of gasoline, methanol, and the M85 blend.
The price of gasoline is obtained by dividing the per barrel oil price by 42
(42 gallons in a barrel), and by adding various costs and taxes.6 These
costs are per gallon and include 10.1 cents for capital costs, 7.1 cents for
operating costs, 12.5 cents for distribution and retail markup and 26.4 cents
for taxes.
In calculating the price of methanol per gallon, we assume that the
feedstock is natural gas. We use the following rule of thumb for calculating
the wellhead price of gas from oil prices:'
PNG - 0.1532(Pou ) - 0.10 .
This formula gives the price of natural gas at the wellhead per thousand cubic
feet. We use a conversion factor of 0.095 for calculating the price of
natural gas per gallon.a Other charges are operating and maintenance costs
and capital costs for a total of 18 cents to arrive at the refinery gate price
for methanol. To this price we add distribution and marketing costs of 17.7
cents per gallon. Methanol has one-half the BTU content of gasoline and
hence one would need two gallons of methanol to go the same distance as on one
gallon of gasoline. However, methanol has better fuel efficiency and can be
expected to be 15 to 25 percent more efficient than gasoline. The conversion
ratios for methanol calculated by Krupnick et. al. range from 1.58 to 1.75 for
different levels of efficiency improvement. We assume that fuel efficiency
will be improved 15 percent which translates into a conversion ratio of 1.53
6These costs are from Krupnick, Walls and Toman (1990).
7From Barron and Brown (1986).
8See Sweeney (1990), p. 300.
8for M85 and 1.75 for MlOO. We then add taxes of 26.4 cents per gallon to
arrive at the pump price for methanol. 9 The M85 blend is calculated as a
weighted average of gasoline and methanol prices.
The M85 blend and MlOO are initially phased-in over eight years, which is
the average life of a vehicle.10 The phasing-in period is later varied for
sensitivity studies.
To calculate the losses or gains in consumer welfare from the switch to
alternative fuels, we need to know the quantity of fuel consumed. We obtain
the demand for fuel by using estimated price and income elasticities for
gasoline and the price of fuel calculated from the model. The long run price
elasticity of gasoline is taken as -0.82 and the income elasticity as 1.33."
4. Discussion of Results
A switch from gasoline to methanol powered vehicles in the U.S. changes
the world price of oil because the transportation sector is a large oil
consumer. The transportation sector in the U.S. makes up 63 percent of total
U.S. oil consumption, which is about 13.4 percent of free world oil
consumption. The results reported in this study overstate the effects of any
switch into alternative fuels because it is assumed that all vehicles will be
using either the M85 blend or MlOO at the end of the phasing-in period. In
reality, the numbers will most likely be much smaller. However, complete
vehicle dedication is a necessary assumption to highlight the qualitative
gAll estimates of taxes, distribution and operating costs are from
Krupnick et. al. (1990).
'OSee Motor Vehicles Facts and Figures '90
"See Morland, Skelley and Reznek (1981) for the price elasticity Dahl
and Sterner (1989) for the income elasticity.
9effects of the switch to methanol.
The model is simulated initially for a base case with no phasing-in of
methanol. The second case is a phasing-in of M85 over an 8-year period, and
the third case is the phasing-in of MIOO over 8 years. In the base case,
simulated U.S. production is somewhat higher than actual 1987 production, oil
prices are lower and total U.S. demand slightly higher. The initial price of
oil is $13.28 and rises to $39.99 over the 40-year time horizon. U.S
production at the beginning of the time period is 51 percent of total
consumption, but falls to 40 percent at the end of the time horizon. The
average price of gasoline is 95 cents per gallon at the pump initially and
rises to $1.56 as oil prices increase (see Table 1).
When M85 is phased-in over an 8-year time period, the initial price of
oil falls by 14 percent to $11.38 per barrel. As a higher percentage of cars
start using M85, the difference between the base case and M85 price path for
oil gets larger. The final price for oil is $30.52 per barrel and is 21
percent less than the base case price. The same pattern is seen with MlOO:
Initial prices fall 16 percent and final prices fall 25 percent when MlOO is
phased-in (see Figure 1).
Because producers have perfect foresight in this model, domestic
production is dramatically increased when alternate fuels begin to be phased
in. Figure 2 shows that with both M85 and MlOO, production is higher than the
base case for the first three years, then starts falling below the base case
as gasoline is phased out. With the switch to non-gasoline fuels, imports of
oil also fall. However, with both M85 and MlOO, the amount of oil consumed in
non-transportation uses increases because the price of oil is less.
The price of methanol and the price of fuel also change as alternative
10fuels are phased-in, as shown in Figure 3: The price of methanol as a
feedstock falls when M8S is the transportation fuel. The economies of scale in
methanol production could enable such a fall in methanol prices. As more and
more methanol is demanded and produced, refineries would become more efficient
in production and the price of methanol could fall. The initial price per
gallon of M8S however, is higher than the price of gasoline (this price is the
gasoline equivalent price at the pump), because methanol is more expensive
than pure gasoline. After gasoline is phased-out and oil prices fall, the
blended fuel becomes cheaper. Hence, in the later years (about 10 years after
phasing-in) the amount of transportation fuel consumed is higher with the
blend than with gasoline. At the end of the time horizon of 40 years, fuel
consumption is 4 percent higher with M8S than with gasoline.
The results are opposite with MIOO. Since MIOO is pure methanol, it is
less efficient than M8S and hence is more expensive on a gasoline equivalent
basis. The price of fuel in this case is 22 percent higher than gasoline
initially and stays higher throughout the time horizon. Consequently, the
total amount of fuel consumed is less in this case than with the other fuels.
Who benefits from the use of alternative fuels? Since the world price of
oil falls as a consequence of the switch to alternate fuels in the U.S., all
oil consumers in the world benefit from this switch. On the other hand, both
domestic and foreign producers of oil are worse off. Domestic producers are
worse off on two counts: both the price of oil and their sales are reduced.
The present value of profits over the 40 year time horizon for domestic
producers falls 46 percent with M8S and 51 percent with MIOO. OPEC's profits
from the sale of oil to the U.S. also suffer, down 40 percent with M8S and 44
percent with MIOO. However, OPEC's sales to the rest of the world could
11increase. The model does not take into account the increase in non-U.S.
consumption which would occur when oil prices fell. Hence, OPEC's overall
profits could go up or down, depending on the relative magnitude of its sales
to non-U.S. customers.
U.S. consumers of gasoline are clearly made worse off by the switch to
alternative fuels. Although the price of M85 falls below that of gasoline in
the later years, there are losses in consumers surplus overall. The total
discounted present value of the changes in consumer surplus with both M85 and
MIOa is positive, meaning a net loss in consumer surplus over the 40 year time
horizon.
The share of imports in total U.S. oil consumption does not fall as we
switch to alternative fuels [Figure 4]. The fall in the price of oil
discourages domestic oil production, but encourages consumption. The only
gain brought about by the change to methanol is the decrease in the oil import
bill. Although oil imports as a percentage of total oil consumption increase,
the total discounted value of oil imports in the 4D years falls 31 percent
with the switch to M85 and 35 percent with the switch to M1DD.
Summary and Conclusions
A switch from gasoline to alternative fuels will have repercussions not
only in domestic markets, but in the international oil market as well, because
the U.S. transportation sector is such a large consumer of oil. A gradual
change over to M85 or M1DD decreases the world price of oil and decreases
domestic production and consumption of oil. Although total domestic
consumption of oil falls, the consumption of oil in non-transportation uses
increases because of lower oil prices.
12Does the switch to alternative fuels achieve the goals of lowering
pollution and increasing energy security? Using MlOO as the sole
transportation fuel will clearly achieve the goal of less pollution because
of two factors: 1) MlOO is a cleaner burning fuel than gasoline, and 2) less
fuel is consumed with MlOO due to higher fuel prices.
However, MIOO will never be the market's choice of fuel because of its higher
cost and would have to be clearly mandated by the government if it is to be
used. With MaS, the pollution goal will also probably be achieved, but less
effectively. MaS pollutes more than MlOO: at equal consumption levels,
pollution would be higher with MaS. Moreover, this study shows that fuel
consumption increases with MaS above that with gasoline because of its lower
cost in later years. Therefore, MaS would clearly not be as effective in
combating pollution as MlOO, and could be worse than pure gasoline, depending
on the magnitude of the increase in demand.
In terms of national security issues, completely switching to methanol
will make the U.S. less vulnerable to oil supply shocks by making us less
dependent on oil. The transportation sector will be more or less shielded
from an oil supply disruption. However, switching to an alternative fuel does
not decrease the share of oil imports in U.S. oil consumption. Hence, other
sectors of the U.S. economy will still be vulnerable to oil supply shocks, and
even more so than before because their oil consumption will have increased.
Moreover, the low oil prices resulting from the change to alternative fuels
lead to a reduction in domestic production, and will probably lead to a
reduction in domestic development and exploration activities also. Therefore,
the answer to the vulnerability question remains ambiguous.
Although the U.S. has ample natural gas reserves, domestic natural gas
13will not be the cheapest feedstock for methanol production. The most
inexpensive natural gas will most likely come from Trinidad, Australia, or the
Middle East and later perhaps the Soviet Union. Hence methanol feedstock
could also be vulnerable to supply disruptions, albeit in a less drastic way.
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Initial Oil Price $13.28 $11.38 $11.12
Final Oil Price $38.99 $30.52 $28.19
Initial Fuel Price s 0.95 s 1.05 $ 1.16
Final Fuel Price s 1. 56 $ 1.49 $ 1.62
U.S. Producer Profits $214,734 $115,346 $103,692
(discounted billion $)
Oil Import Bill $803,616 $551,919 $519,689
(discounted, billion $)
Consumer Losses 0.0 $1300 $5888
(discounted, billion $)
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